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ABSTRACT
A good auction design promotes both an efﬁ  cient assignment of rights 
and competitive revenues for the seller. The two key factors that deter-
mine the best design are the structure of bidder preferences and the degree 
of competition. With weak competition and “additive values,” a simulta-
neous  ﬁ rst- price   sealed- bid auction may sufﬁ  ce. With more complex value 
structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the   clock-  proxy 
auction, is likely needed to increase efﬁ  ciency and maximize revenues. 
Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases 
Government Take by reducing oil company risk.
INTRODUCTION
There are many ways for states to assign oil rights. Rights are sometimes 
assigned via informal pro  cesses, such as   ﬁ  r s t -  c o m e -  ﬁ  r s t -  s e r v e ,   o r   o t h e r  
pro cesses,  such as “beauty contests,” in which companies submit explo-
ration and development plans. In this chapter, however, I examine the 
design of auctions for oil rights, focusing especially on issues faced in 
developing countries. For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that 
revenue maximization is the overriding objective. While certainly there 
can be other objectives, such as the timing of the revenues and country 
employment and investment (see chapter 3), in what follows, I assume 
that revenue is the main objective. In this context, the advantage of an 
auction is that it is a transparent method of assignment, which if well 
designed is capable of maximizing the revenues that a developing coun-
try can receive from its oil and gas endowments. Nonetheless, there are 
advantages and disadvantages of different auction designs for   oil- and   gas- producing  developing  countries,  which render the design of auc-
tions especially important.
Design and pro  cess issues are in fact especially important with develop-
ing countries. While it is always necessary to tailor a design to a par  tic  u  lar 
setting, we can draw a number of general insights from recent auction the-
ory and practice, both in oil rights auctions and in other sectors. The ﬁ  rst 
step is deﬁ  ning the product: the term of the license, the block size, royalties 
and tax obligations, and so on. Next, a number of basic design issues must 
be resolved: whether to sell rights sequentially or simultaneously, whether 
to use a dynamic or a static auction, what information policy should be 
used, and whether and how reserve prices should be set. In considering 
these questions, risks of collusion and corruption must also be examined.
Much depends on the structure of bidder preferences (or “values”). 
Two aspects of bidder preferences are especially important. The ﬁ  rst is 
that the values to a bidder of a par  tic  u  lar item might depend on what 
other items he already owns. Items for   sale—the right to explore and de-
velop oil and gas on a par  tic  u  lar geographic   block—are sometimes “sub-
stitutes” and sometimes “complements,” in the sense that sometimes 
possessing one right (a block for instance) makes other rights less valuable 
for a par  tic  u  lar bidder, but sometimes possessing one right makes other 
rights more valuable. If for a par  tic  u  lar bidder, the value of one block is in-
de  pen  dent of own  ership of another, then we say that the values are addi-
tive. The second is that, unlike in many settings, the values that the 
bidders place on oil and gas rights may be interdependent across the dif-
ferent bidders, since each bidder has private information, from surveys 
and seismic tests, that is relevant in determining the overall value of a 
block. Bidders have “common values” if it is the case that the ex post value 
of the block is the same for all bidders. This ex post value is unknown at 
the time of the auction; bidders have only estimates of the common value 
from the surveys, seismic tests, and expert analysis they have conducted.
Auction theory suggests that when bidders have preference structures 
like   this—viewing blocks as substitutes or as complements and having 
common values with private information, then some version of a simulta-
neous ascending auction is best, since this will promote efﬁ  cient pricing 
and packaging of the blocks. In brief, a simultaneous ascending auction is 
characterized by the simultaneous sale of many related blocks using an as-
cending price pro  cess in which bidders can improve their bids for the 
blocks. The auction ends when no bidder is willing to bid higher for 
any block.
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There are a number of different types of simultaneous ascending auc-
tions. At one extreme is the   clock-  proxy auction (Ausubel et al. 2006), a 
sophisticated version of the simultaneous ascending auction often used in 
the auction of radio spectrum. The mechanics of the   clock-  proxy auction 
are discussed in greater detail later. The   clock-  proxy auction is a method 
of auctioning many related items over multiple bidding rounds, allowing 
bids on packages of items. The auction begins with a clock phase. The 
auctioneer names a price for each block and the bidders respond with the 
set of blocks they desire at the speciﬁ  ed prices. Prices increase on blocks 
with more than one bid. The pro  cess continues until there are no blocks 
with more than one bid. After this, there is a ﬁ  nal proxy round in which 
bidders express values for any desired packages of blocks. An efﬁ  cient as-
signment of blocks is found based on the proxy bids and all the bids in the 
clock phase; prices are determined, and an efﬁ  cient assignment of blocks 
is found.
The   clock- proxy auction encourages effective price discovery in the 
clock phase and the proxy round promotes an efﬁ  cient assignment and 
competitive revenues. Although this approach may appear complex, it is 
actually simpler for bidders than common alternatives. The reason is that, 
although the rules may appear complex, the best strategies for bidders are 
simple. The price discovery reduces guesswork and focuses the bidders’ at-
tention on the relevant part of the price space; then the proxy round gives 
the bidders a means to further express package preferences and   ﬁ  ne- tune 
the assignment of blocks. The approach is well suited for excellent pros-
pects, with complex value structures, like those described in the preceding 
text.
At the other extreme is the   ﬁ  rst- price   sealed- bid auction used in the 
United States for offshore leases. The bidders simultaneously submit bids 
for each desired block. Each block is awarded to the highest bidder at the 
winning bid price. This simple format is suitable for marginal blocks with 
nearly additive value structures (the value of a package is equal to the sum 
of the values of the individual blocks) and small value interdependencies 
across bidders.
Still other designs between these two extremes are appropriate when 
the bidder preferences are not so complex that package bidding is essential 
and not so simple as additive values. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
develop the logic of these different types of auction in more detail and 
discuss when one type of design is likely to work better than another. I be-
gin with some motivating insights from auction theory and practice. I then consider bidder preferences and some of the basic design issues in oil 
rights auctions. The following three sections address problems speciﬁ  c to 
developing countries and the experience with oil rights auctions and auc-
tions in other sectors. I then describe the   clock-  proxy auction and in the 
ﬁ  nal section consider a number of alternative auction formats and make 
recommendations based on the par  tic  u  lar setting.
KEY INSIGHTS FROM AUCTION THEORY AND PRACTICE
WHY AUCTION?
Auctions allocate and price scarce resources in settings of uncertainty. Ev-
ery auction asks and answers the basic question: who should get the items 
and at what prices? Auctions are a formal and transparent method of as-
signment. Clear rules are established for the auction pro  cess. Transpar-
ency beneﬁ  ts both the bidders and the country. It mitigates potential 
corruption and encourages competition through a fair and open pro  cess.
A primary advantage of an auction is its tendency to assign the blocks 
to those best able to use them. Although this does not always occur (a 
number of  features that limit the efﬁ  ciency of auctions are discussed 
later), the competitive character of auctions makes it more likely: Compa-
nies with the highest estimates of value for the blocks are likely to be will-
ing to bid higher than the others, and hence tend to win the blocks.
Informal pro  cesses, such as negotiation on a   ﬁ  rst- come- ﬁ  rst- serve basis, 
lack transparency and are vulnerable to favoritism and corruption, which 
undermines competition. The reduced competition inherent in an infor-
mal pro  cess reduces both the efﬁ  ciency of the assignment and the coun-
try’s revenues. Informal pro  cesses also ten d t o be m o r e vuln e rab l e t o 
expropriation, further discouraging competition.
A leading alternative to auctions is an administrative pro  cess, often 
called “beauty contests,” in which oil companies present plans for explo-
ration and development according to a formal pro  cess. This approach 
may be more ﬂ  exible than auctions, but it makes the assignment less 
transparent and more vulnerable to favoritism and corruption.
DOES AUCTION DESIGN MATTER?
One of the most important results of auction theory is the “revenue equiva-
lence theorem.” The revenue equivalence theorem makes a remarkable 
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claim: under par  tic  u  lar assumptions, the four standard methods for auc-
tioning a single item (ﬁ  rst- price   sealed- bid,   second- price   sealed- bid,  En glish 
ascending, and Dutch descending)1 all result in exactly the same expected 
revenue for the seller. In each case, the expected revenue is equal to the ex-
pected value placed on the item by the bidder who values it the second 
most. Further, when the seller sets an appropriate reserve price, these four 
methods all result in revenues that are at least as large as those that can be 
achieved from any other trading mechanism. From this striking result, one 
might conclude that auction design is of little   importance—that all stan-
dard auctions perform well.
This, however, is the wrong conclusion. The assumptions required for 
the revenue equivalence theorem are quite special; notably the theory as-
sumes that sellers are auctioning a single item, that bidders have in  de  pen-
dent private values, that bidders are risk neutral, that the number of 
bidders is in  de  pen  dent of the type of auction used and that there is no col-
lusion or corruption, and except for their different valuations of the good, 
bidders are otherwise identical to each other. In practice, none of these as-
sumptions holds: many related items are for sale; bidder values depend at 
least in part on value estimates of other bidders and these estimates are 
correlated; bidder participation decisions are of paramount importance; 
bidders care about risk; there are ex ante differences among the bidders 
(e.g., some are large and some are small); and mitigating collusion and 
corruption are important. Each of these features impacts the  per for mance 
of alternative auction designs. The choice of the best auction design de-
pends on which of these different features are most salient.
PRODUCT DEFINITION
The ﬁ  rst step is product   deﬁ  nition—what is being sold. There are two key 
elements: (1) the contract terms of the license (duration, royalties, tax obli-
gations) and (2) the geographic scope of the blocks. The ﬁ  rst of these is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3. The determination of the second de-
pends to a large extent on local context and I do not discuss it at length 
  here. In general, however, blocks are deﬁ  ned as rectangular blocks, as 
speciﬁ  ed by a pair of longitude and latitude coordinates. The appropriate 
size of the blocks depends on the quality of the prospect. More promising 
regions support smaller blocks. In the United States, blocks are nomi-
nated by the oil companies. This is a sensible approach in most cases be-
cause it guarantees at least some interest in the auctioned blocks.AUCTION PRO  CESS
As important as the auction design itself is the pro  cess through which the 
auction takes place. To promote transparency, the auction pro  cess must be 
speciﬁ  ed well in advance of the tender. The pro  cess should be open to all oil 
companies on a nondiscriminatory basis. The pro  cess should begin with a 
public advertisement of the tender and a complete description of the proce-
dure for awarding a license should be provided, including bidder qualiﬁ  ca-
tion procedures and the auction rules. Such a clear and complete statement 
of  the auction pro  cess is essential to bidder participation. The country 
should be committed to the pro  cess. Finally, the pro  cess should allow for 
and encourage input from the oil companies in a transparent setting with 
“sunshine” rules that require public announcement of the content of meet-
ings between the country and the oil companies. At a minimum, this would 
include the nomination of blocks, but allowing comments on all aspects of 
the rule making is generally worthwhile. Bidder participation and bids are 
enhanced if legitimate bidder concerns and preferences are addressed.
BIDDER PREFERENCES AND AUCTION DESIGN
THE STRUCTURE OF BIDDER PREFERENCES
Before considering design issues, it is helpful to think ﬁ  rst about the bid-
ders’ preferences. We consider two aspects of bidder preferences that af-
fect the optimal design of auctions: the interdependence of valuations 
across bidders and the interdependence of valuations across blocks.
Interdependence of valuations across bidders
In the study of auctions there are three standard models for describing the 
valuations of bidders: private values, common values, and interdependent 
values.
If there are private values then this means that each bidder’s value does 
not depend on the private information of the other bidders. Each bidder 
has its own valuation of the expected worth (to it) of the different pack-
ages of items on sale.
If there are common values, then packages of items have the same value 
to all bidders. But these values are unknown. The value can be written as 
a function of the individual bidder’s private information, as well as the in-
formation held by all other bidders. The more a given bidder knows about 
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other bidders’ valuations, the better is that bidder able to estimate the 
worth of the item.
If there are interdependent values, then each bidder’s value of a package 
depends on his private information as well as the private information of 
the other bidders. This is a more general formulation and both private 
and common values can be written as special cases of interdependent val-
ues. With interdependent values, each bidder has its own estimates of the 
value which is a function of the bidder’s own information and may also be 
a function of the other bidders’ information. In this situation, a bidder’s 
value depends on the values assigned by other bidders.
The oil rights setting is the textbook example of a common values auc-
tion. All companies value the oil at about the same amount (the world 
price of oil), but there is enormous uncertainty about the quantity of oil 
and the cost of extracting it. Before bidding, each company estimates these 
uncertainties from geological surveys, seismic tests, and analysis of petro-
leum engineers. Yet each company would like to have the private informa-
tion of the other bidders to further reduce uncertainty. The common value 
depends not just on the bidder’s estimate of value, but on all the other esti-
mates. In practice, there are also some private value   elements—the compa-
ny’s exploration and development capacity, its reserves, its expertise in the 
par  tic  u  lar type of prospect, its ability to manage exploration and po  liti-
cal   risks—but these elements typically are of secondary importance. Thus, 
the oil rights setting has interdependent values with strong common value 
elements.
In situations in which there are common values, the strategies chosen by 
bidders are conditioned by a phenomenon known as the winner’s curse. This 
is the insight that winning an item in an auction is actually bad news for the 
winner about the item’s true value, because winning implies that no other 
bidder was willing to bid as much for the item. Hence, it is likely that the 
winner’s estimate of value is an overestimate. Since a bidder’s bid is relevant 
only in the event that the bidder wins, the bidder should condition the bid 
on the negative information winning conveys about value. Bidders that fail 
to condition their bids on the bad news winning conveys suffer from the 
winner’s curse in the sense that they often pay more for an item than it is 
worth. In oil rights auctions, adjusting bids in light of the winner’s curse is 
a key element of strategy. In contrast, in private values auctions, there is no 
winner’s curse: each bidder knows what value he or she places on the object 
and this value does not depend on the values of the others.Interdependence of valuations across blocks
Thus far, we have focused on how package values depend on private infor-
mation. A second important dimension is the structure of package values. 
How does the bidder value a package of blocks?
The simplest valuation model is additive values: the value of a package 
is the sum of the values of the individual blocks. In oil rights auctions, ad-
ditive values are a good ﬁ  rst approximation. The primary determinant of 
value is the quantity of oil, and the quantity of oil in a package of blocks 
is simply the sum of the quantities in each block. However, sometimes val-
ues may also be either subadditive or superadditive.
With subadditive values, the value of a package is less than the sum of 
the individual values. One source of subadditive values is capacity con-
straints on exploration and reﬁ  ning. Additional blocks have less value if 
the company lacks the resources to efﬁ  ciently exploit that value. Another 
source is risk, holding many blocks within the same region where values 
are highly correlated is riskier than holding a few blocks in each of many 
dispersed regions. Values for substitute goods are subadditive.
With superadditive values, the value of a package is greater than the sum 
of the individual values. Superadditive values arise if there are synergies or 
blocks act as complements. One source of complements is exploration and 
production efﬁ  ciencies that arise from holding many neighboring blocks. 
Traditional economies of scale may arise in drilling from sharing staff and 
equipment. A more subtle form of complements comes from more efﬁ  cient 
exploration. For example, if two neighboring blocks are owned by different 
companies, each may have an incentive to free   ride on the exploration ef-
forts of the   other—waiting to see if the other’s drilling is successful. As a re-
sult, the exploration of both tracts may be inefﬁ  ciently delayed. Hendricks 
and Porter (1996) provide both a theoretical model and empirical support 
for this behavior in the U.S. offshore oil lease auctions. If instead, the two 
blocks are held by the same company, there is no information externality 
and the blocks are explored efﬁ  ciently. A related synergy comes from the 
common pool problem, in which neighboring blocks are drawing oil from 
the same pool. When the blocks are held by the same company, the exploi-
tation of the pool is efﬁ  cient; whereas, with separately held blocks, the com-
panies would need to negotiate a unitization agreement to coordinate the 
development. Ideally, blocks are deﬁ  ned to avoid this problem, but the 
country may not have sufﬁ  cient information to avoid it entirely.
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In the oil rights setting, additive values may be a good ﬁ  rst approxima-
tion. Nonetheless, complements (superadditivity) and substitutes (subad-
ditivity) likely are important in at least some applications. If this is the 
case, then the auction design needs to allow for efﬁ  cient packaging. Oth-
erwise, if values are largely additive, then packaging issues can be safely 
ignored, resulting in a much simpler auction design.
BASIC DESIGN ISSUES
Given this characterization of the different ways that bidders might value 
a set of blocks I now address several key issues of auction design in the oil 
rights setting.
OPEN BIDDING OR SEALED BIDDING?
Especially in contexts where there is interdependence of valuations across 
bidders, open bidding is generally better than a single sealed bid. An essen-
tial advantage of open bidding is that the bidding pro  cess reveals informa-
tion about individual valuations. This information promotes the efﬁ  cient 
assignment of licenses, since bidders can condition their bids on more in-
formation. Moreover, since bidders’ private information is likely to be posi-
tively correlated, open bidding may raise auction revenues (Milgrom and 
Weber 1982). Intuitively, bidders are able to bid more aggressively in an 
open auction, since they have better information about the item’s value. 
The open bidding reveals information about the other bidders’ estimates of 
value. This information reduces the bidder’s uncertainty about value, and 
thus mitigates the winner’s   curse—the possibility of paying more than the 
value of the item. Thus, bidders are able to bid more aggressively, and this 
translates into high revenues for the seller. That turns out to be a strong ar-
gument in favor of open rather than sealed bidding.
Sealed bidding has some advantages. Most importantly, a   sealed- bid 
design is less susceptible to collusion, such as agreements among oil com-
panies not to compete against each other (Milgrom 1987). Open bidding 
allows bidders to signal through their bids and establish tacit agreements. 
With open bidding, these tacit agreements can be enforced, since a bidder 
can immediately punish another that has deviated from the collusive 
agreement. Signaling and punishments are not possible with a single 
sealed bid. So in situations in which collusion is a major concern, sealed 
bidding may make more sense.A second advantage of sealed bidding is that if there are ex ante differ-
ences among the bidders, it may yield higher revenues (Klemperer 2002; 
Maskin and Riley 2000). This is especially the case if the bidders are risk 
averse and have in de pen dent private values. The reason is that in a   sealed-
  bid auction, a strong bidder can guarantee victory only by placing a high 
bid; even if a strong bidder who expects to win has a good sense of what 
the next most likely winner is willing to bid, he is likely to bid some mar-
gin above this to avoid the risk of losing the block. In an open auction on 
the other hand, the strong bidder never needs to bid higher than the sec-
ond highest value.
In the oil rights auctions, an open auction probably is best, provided 
the design adequately addresses potential collusion. The reason is that 
values have a strong common value element and so the beneﬁ  ts of sealed 
bids are not so great but the beneﬁ  ts of an open auction are substantial.2
SHOULD AUCTIONS OF MULTIPLE BLOCKS BE RUN  
SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SEQUENTIALLY?
Generally, simultaneous open bidding is better for the seller than sequen-
tial auctions. A disadvantage of sequential auctions is that they limit the 
information available to bidders and limit how the bidders can respond to 
information. With sequential auctions, bidders must guess what prices 
will be in future auctions when determining bids in the current auction. 
Incorrect guesses may result in an inefﬁ  cient assignment when item values 
are interdependent. A sequential auction also eliminates many strategies. 
A bidder cannot switch back to an earlier item if prices go too high in a 
later auction. Bidders are likely to regret having purchased early at high 
prices, or not having purchased early at low prices. The guesswork about 
future auction outcomes makes strategies in sequential auctions complex, 
and the outcomes less efﬁ  cient.
In a simultaneous ascending auction, a large collection of related items is 
up for auction at the same time. Hence, the bidders get information about 
prices on all the items as the auction proceeds. Bidders can switch among 
items based on this information. Hence, there is less of a need to anticipate 
where prices are likely to go. Moreover, the auction generates market prices. 
Similar items sell for similar prices. Bidders do not regret having bought too 
early or too late and with less fear of such regrets are willing to bid more.
Proponents of sequential auctions argue that the relevant informa-
tion for the bidders is the ﬁ  nal prices and assignments. They argue that 
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simultaneous auctions do not reveal ﬁ  nal outcomes until the auction is 
over. In contrast, the sequential auction gives ﬁ  nal information about 
prices and assignments for all prior auctions. This ﬁ  nal information 
may be more useful to bidders than the preliminary information re-
vealed in a simultaneous auction. However, empirical analysis of simul-
taneous ascending auctions indicates that the preliminary information 
is highly correlated with ﬁ  nal outcomes (Cramton 1997).
Supporters of sequential auctions also point out that the great ﬂ  exibil-
ity of a simultaneous auction makes it more susceptible to collusive strate-
gies. Since nothing is assigned until the end in a simultaneous auction, 
bidders can punish aggressive bidding by raising the bids on those items 
desired by the aggressive bidder. In a sequential auction, collusion is more 
difﬁ  cult. A bidder that is supposed to win a later item at a low price is vul-
nerable to competition from another that won an earlier item at a low 
price. The early winner no longer has an incentive to hold back in the 
later auctions. This potential problem, however, can be mitigated through 
an effective information policy, which determines what information is 
made public during the auction.
In oil rights auctions, the virtues of the simultaneous   auction—greater in-
formation release and greater bidder ﬂ  exibility in responding to  information—
would improve efﬁ  ciency. But as with our arguments for adopting open 
bidding over sealed bidding, this depends in part on how well concerns about 
bidder collusion can be addressed.
SHOULD BIDDERS BID FOR INDIVIDUAL BLOCKS  
SEPARATELY OR FOR PACKAGES OF BLOCKS?
In general, it is a good idea for the seller to allow bidders to give different 
bids for different packages. Package bidding is desirable when a bidder’s 
value of a block depends on what other blocks it wins. Package bidding 
also has advantages when bidders have bud  get constraints or other con-
straints that depend on the package of blocks won. Then bidders may pre-
fer being able to bid on a combination of blocks, rather than having to 
place a number of individual bids. With a package bid, the bidder either 
gets the entire combination or nothing. There is no possibility that the 
bidder will end up winning just some of what it needs or that it wins more 
than it wishes to pay for.
With individual bids, bidding for a synergistic combination is risky. 
The bidder may fail to acquire key pieces of the desired combination, but may pay prices based on the synergistic gain. Alternatively, the bidder 
may be forced to bid beyond its valuation to secure the synergies and re-
duce its loss from being stuck with some   low-  value blocks. This is called 
the exposure problem. Individual bidding exposes bidders seeking syner-
gistic combinations to aggregation risk.
To see how not allowing package bids can create inefﬁ  ciencies, con-
sider the following example of two bidders bidding for two adjacent park-
ing spaces. One bidder with a car and a trailer requires both spaces. She 
values the two spots together at $100 and a single spot is worth nothing; 
the spots are perfect complements. The second bidder has a car, but no 
trailer. Either spot is worth $75, as is the combination; the spots are per-
fect substitutes. Note that the efﬁ  cient outcome is for the ﬁ  rst bidder to 
get both spots for a social gain of $100, rather than $75 if the second bid-
der gets a spot. Yet any attempt by the ﬁ  rst bidder to win the spaces is 
foolhardy. The ﬁ  rst bidder would have to pay at least $150 for the spaces, 
since the second bidder will bid up to $75 for either one. Alternatively, if 
the ﬁ  rst bidder drops out early, she will “win” one license, losing an 
amount equal to her highest bid. The only equilibrium is for the second 
bidder to win a single spot by placing the minimum bid. The outcome is 
inefﬁ  cient, and fails to generate any revenue. In contrast, if package bids 
are allowed, then the outcome is efﬁ  cient. The ﬁ  rst bidder wins both spots 
with a bid of $75 for the pair of spots.
This example is somewhat extreme but it illustrates well the exposure 
problem. The inefﬁ  ciency involves large   bidder-  speciﬁ  c complementari-
ties and a lack of competition. In practice, the complementarities in oil 
rights auctions are likely to be less extreme and the competition is likely 
to be greater.
Unfortunately, allowing package bids creates other problems. Package 
bids may favor bidders seeking large aggregations as a result of a variant of 
the   free- rider problem, called the threshold problem. Continuing with the 
last example, suppose that there is a third bidder who values either spot at 
$40. Then the efﬁ  cient outcome is for the individual bidders to win both 
spots for a social gain of $75 + $40 = $115. But this outcome may not oc-
cur when values are privately known. Suppose that the second and third 
bidders have placed individual bids of $35 on the two licenses, but these 
bids are topped by a package bid of $90 from the ﬁ  rst bidder. Each bid-
der hopes that the other will bid higher to top the package bid. The sec-
ond bidder has an incentive to understate his willingness to push the 
bidding higher. He may refrain from bidding, counting on the third bidder 
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to break the threshold of $90. Since the third bidder cannot come through, 
the auction ends with the ﬁ  rst bidder winning both spaces for $90.
A second problem with allowing package bids is complexity. If all combi-
nations are allowed, even identifying the revenue maximizing assignment is 
a difﬁ  cult integer programming problem when there are many bidders and 
items. Nonetheless, our understanding of and experience with package auc-
tions has advanced considerably in recent years (Cramton et al. 2006). 
Package bids should therefore now be considered a viable option. Whether 
package bids are the best option will depend somewhat on the details of 
the setting.
HOW SHOULD RESERVE PRICES BE USED?
Reserve prices in oil rights auctions have two main purposes: (1) to guaran-
tee substantial revenue in auctions where competition is weak but the re-
serve is met and (2) to limit the incentive  for—and the impact  of—collusive 
bidding. Reserve prices mitigate collusive bidding by reducing the maxi-
mum gain of the collusive bidding. In effect, this heightens the competi-
tion between bidders by increasing the importance of the gains they can 
make unilaterally relative to the gains they can make through collusion. 
Setting reserve prices for oil rights auctions is difﬁ  cult given the enormous 
uncertainty of values. There is, however, an alternative to posting a reserve 
price that can be considered and that has, for example, been used in the 
United States. It is possible for the seller to place a low minimum bid that 
applies to all blocks, and then accept or reject winning bids ex post (note 
the idea is to decide ex post whether to accept or reject a winning bid not to 
pick and choose between bidders ex post). Under such a system a reserve 
price exists but it is secret and can in fact depend on the observed bidding 
behavior.
BONUS BID, ROYALTIES, AND PRODUCTION SHARING
Oil rights auctions commonly involve bonus bids and either royalties or 
production sharing (see chapters 2 and 3 for further discussions of the 
merits of these different approaches). The bonus bid or signature bonus is 
the upfront payment determined in auction for the right to explore and 
develop the block during the license period. If exploitable reserves are 
found, the license is renewed for a nominal fee as long as development 
continues. The royalty is the share of the oil and gas revenues that goes to the government. Royalty rates vary country to country and even within 
countries. For example, in the U.S. offshore oil lease auctions, the royalty 
rate is 1/6, where   one-  sixth of revenues for any oil extracted is paid as a 
royalty, whereas the onshore rate typically is 1/8. The motivation for roy-
alties is to have the oil company payment more closely reﬂ  ect ex post real-
ized value. This reduces the risk of the oil company. The disadvantage of 
royalties is that, like a tax, it distorts investment decisions. A larger royalty 
rate reduces the incentive for the oil company to invest in exploration and 
development activities. In contrast, the signature bonus is a sunk cost af-
ter the auction and does not distort subsequent investments. In a setting 
where there is no uncertainty about values, then only a bonus bid is 
needed (a zero royalty rate); in a setting where exploration and develop-
ment are costless, then a 100 percent royalty rate is optimal. In practice, 
oil rights auctions have large uncertainty about values as well as large ex-
ploration and development costs. Thus, an intermediate rate is generally 
best.
Production- sharing  contracts (PSCs) attempt to further reduce oil 
company risk and better manage investment incentives by specifying the 
terms of cost sharing and proﬁ  t sharing throughout exploration and de-
velopment. The contract can allow the oil company to recover exploration 
and development capital costs before the country shares in the revenues. 
Then the government’s proﬁ  t share increases with the success of the proj-
ect, allowing the terms to handle both marginal and windfall economics. 
The contracts often are made immune to tax changes by having the gov-
ernment counterparty, typically the national oil company, liable for all 
taxes. Work programs specify a minimum level of exploration effort. This 
is an important constraint on more marginal blocks, where high govern-
ment proﬁ  t shares might otherwise discourage exploration.
With PSCs, it is common for bidding to be over the government’s 
highest proﬁ  t share, rather than the signature bonus. Thus, bidders com-
pete on their willingness to share proﬁ  ts in the most favorable circum-
stances. This approach, used recently in Libya and Venezuela, reduces 
oil company risk without upsetting development incentives, since the 
bid share only applies for blocks that are highly successful. Development 
incentives are further maintained by having the government share in 
the development capital costs and the operating costs. If the government’s 
share of development capital and operating costs is the same as its 
  production share, then   post-  exploration the project essentially is a joint 
venture with   ﬁ  rst- best  incentives for development.
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PROBLEMS SPECIFIC TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developing countries face additional challenges in establishing an effec-
tive auction program. These include po  liti  cal risk, risk for companies of 
expropriation, favoritism, and corruption. All of these challenges tend to 
discourage participation in auctions and so reduce competition. In fact, 
the strongest indicator of success of the auction program is the presence of 
robust competition. The geological prospect of the region is a primary fac-
tor in attracting oil companies, but  po liti cal,  legal, and pro  cess factors are 
also key.
There is little a country can do in the short term to reduce perceptions 
of  po liti cal  risk. Legal risks can be reduced through choice of contract 
law. And over the medium term, institutions can be developed that pro-
vide the ground rules for oil exploration and development.
Companies’ fear of expropriation or adverse renegotiation can be 
mitigated somewhat through the cash ﬂ  ow structure of the contract 
terms. For example, a pure bonus bid system (zero royalty) is problem-
atic in light of expropriation risks. This would force the oil company to 
sink most funds upfront, making the company vulnerable to expropria-
tion. Even developed countries, such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, have a tendency to adjust tax rates after companies have 
begun production to capture a larger share of “windfall” proﬁ  ts. As a re-
sult, companies heavily discount bonus bids. Some reliance on royalties 
or production sharing is better, since these payments are not due until 
after revenues or proﬁ  ts have been received by the oil company. Another 
option is share bidding in which oil companies offer equity shares in the 
venture (the highest offered share wins the block). In this case, the 
country and the oil company are partners. Each makes investments and 
reaps rewards according to its share. This approach shifts risks from the 
oil companies to the country. More importantly, it aligns the interests of 
the company and the country, reducing expropriation risks for the 
company.
Such approaches are mutually beneﬁ  cial but sometimes appear unat-
tractive for developing countries. Developing countries, especially small 
ones, may have important constraints with respect to cash ﬂ  ows. For ex-
ample, a country may be unable to make upfront outlays and so have 
strong preferences for early payments. However, too much focus on early 
revenues may greatly reduce total revenues, especially in an environment 
where renegotiation risk is high. For this reason, in the medium to long run, countries often are better off with PSCs with small upfront payments 
and large government shares in the event of successful ﬁ  nds.
Finally, favoritism and corruption can be addressed in the auction pro-
cess. A transparent, nondiscriminatory pro  cess is the key to mitigating fa-
voritism and corruption. In  de  pen dent   third- party  auction managers can 
help as well. Likewise, a trustee observing and commenting on all aspects 
of the auction pro  cess can further reduce the possibility of corruption. 
This approach is commonly used in developed countries. For example, 
electricity auctions in restructured electricity markets in North America 
and Eu  rope are typically conducted by in  de  pen  dent third parties, often 
with a further in  de  pen  dent review and certiﬁ  cation of the entire pro  cess 
by an auditor or trustee.
EXPERIENCE WITH OIL RIGHTS AUCTIONS
Oil rights have been auctioned in many countries throughout the world. 
Much can be learned from these experiences.   Here, I focus on the experi-
ences of a wealthy nation, the United States, and compare this with recent 
experiences elsewhere, notably in Venezuela and Libya.
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
The most studied program is the U.S. offshore oil lease auctions. The dis-
cussion that follows draws largely on Porter’s excellent survey of this re-
search (Porter 1995). These oil lease auctions began in 1954. The product 
auctioned is a lease granting the right to explore and develop a par  tic  u  lar 
tract for a period of ﬁ  ve years (U.S. auctions use the terms “lease” and 
“tract,” rather than “license” and “block”). If oil is found and developed, 
the lease is renewed for a nominal fee as long as production continues. The 
pro cess  begins with the oil companies nominating tracts for auction. The 
government then makes a list of tracts to be auctioned. The auction is a si-
multaneous   ﬁ  rst-  price   sealed-  bid auction. Each bidder simultaneously 
submits a bid on each of the tracts it desires. The bid must meet or exceed 
the minimum bid, which is stated as a dollar amount per acre. The   per-
  acre minimum depends only on the type of tract. A tract is either awarded 
to the high bidder or all bids on the tract are rejected; thus, the reserve 
price is secret and determined after the bids are observed by the govern-
ment. A winning bidder pays its bid, which is referred to as the bonus. In 
addition, the company pays a royalty of 1/6 of revenues for any oil extracted. 
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Bidders are allowed to bid jointly; however, after 1975, none of the top 
eight oil companies could combine in a joint bid with another top eight 
company.
Tracts are of three types. Wildcat tracts are new offerings that are not 
adjacent to developed tracts; drainage tracts are adjacent to developed 
tracts; and development tracts are a reoffering. There is an important eco-
nomic difference between wildcat tracts and drainage tracts and these 
differences are reﬂ  ected in the types of auctions used. With a drainage 
tract, bidders holding leases on adjacent tracts may have a much better es-
timate of value than those without adjacent tracts. Thus, the drainage 
tract sales may have large asymmetries among the bidders, whereas in the 
wildcat sales bidders are more symmetric. This difference has important 
implications for both bidding behavior and auction design.  In  par tic u lar, 
one would expect that a simultaneous ascending auction would be best 
for the wildcat tracts and a simultaneous   sealed-  bid auction would be best 
for the drainage tracts. However, the United States, perhaps for reasons of 
inertia, uses the same   sealed-  bid auction method for all tracts.
From 1954 to 1990, there   were 98 auctions. On average, 125 leases sold 
per auction. Eight percent of the high bids   were rejected. The auctions 
raised $55.8 billion from bonus bids and $40 billion from royalties (1972 
dollars). Hendricks et al. (1987) estimate from ex post price and quantity 
data that the government share of value (revenue net of costs) was 77 per-
cent with the oil companies receiving the remaining 23 percent.
Porter (1995) concludes that the U.S. auction program in many respects 
is well designed. Certainly the government is getting the lion’s share of 
the value. On drainage tracts, informed bidders (those with leases on ad-
jacent tracts), reap informational rents. The government could consider 
using a higher royalty rate on these tracts to the extent that the informa-
tional rents are not capitalized in the earlier wildcat sales.
One potentially troubling feature of the U.S. offshore program is the 
use of the simultaneous   ﬁ  rst- price   sealed-  bid format. This is easy for the 
government to implement, but poses challenges to bidders, which may re-
duce efﬁ  ciency and revenues. In par  tic  u  lar, the format prevents the bid-
ders from expressing preferences for packages of tracts and it provides no 
price discovery. In addition, a bidder’s bud get constraints or other  package-
  based constraints either cannot be satisﬁ  ed or can be satisﬁ  ed only by 
greatly distorting one’s bids.
Onshore auctions in the United States are conducted at the state level. 
These auctions often are done as sequential open outcry auctions: each tract is sold in sequence using an En  glish auction. This approach allows 
for some price discovery and better handles bud  get constraints, but it still 
forces bidders to guess auction prices for leases sold later.
EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Unfortunately, there is little publicly available information about oil 
rights auctions in developing countries, and little research on the topic 
(although one important exception is Sunley et al. [2002], who provide 
a study of government revenue sources from oil and gas in developing 
countries). Typically, however, countries employ a range of revenue meth-
ods: bonus bids, royalties, production sharing, income taxes, and state 
equity. Not surprisingly, the terms vary widely across countries, reﬂ  ect-
ing at least in part differences in po  liti  cal risks and geological uncer-
tainty. A reasonable conclusion from the experiences of these countries is 
that auctions are a desirable method of allocating the rights among com-
panies, but multiple revenue sources should be used to best manage risks 
and incentives.
Recent auctions conducted in an environment of high oil prices have 
been highly competitive, especially in regions with known reserves. For 
example, in the Libyan auction of 15 blocks on January 29, 2005, some 
blocks received as many as 15 bids.
Johnston (2005) examined the contract terms and bidding in the 2005 
Libyan auction. This case study offers insights into modern contract terms 
and bidder competition in a major auction of excellent prospects during a 
period of high price expectations. The 15 blocks   were offered in a simulta-
neous   sealed- bid  auction, in which oil companies bid a production share 
and a signature bonus for each desired block. Each license was awarded to 
the company with the highest production share (share of gross revenues 
going to the government). In the event of a tie, the signature bonus was 
used as a tiebreaker.
The contract terms fully specify the split of revenues and costs be-
tween the government and the oil company. Companies bid only on the 
production share and the signature bonuses. Hence, for example, on 
block 54, the winning bid offered a production share of 87.6 percent. In 
effect this means that the government gets 87.6 percent of the gross reve-
nues, for which it pays none of the exploration costs, 50 percent of the 
development capital, and 87.6 percent of the operating costs. The oil 
company uses the remaining 12.4 percent of the gross revenues to recover 
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its costs (100 percent of   exploration costs, 50 percent of development cap-
ital, and 12.4 percent of operating costs). Once these costs are recovered 
from the 12.4 percent, the excess (“proﬁ  t oil”) is split between the gov-
ernment and the oil company according to a sliding scale based on a rev-
enue/cost index. The government’s share of this excess increases from 10 
percent to 50 percent as the company’s revenue/cost index increases from 
1.5 to 3. Under these terms, the initial up-front capital expense is limited 
to the exploration cost and a modest signature bonus. Since development 
capital costs are split 50/50, the high production share does mean that 
some proﬁ  table ﬁ  elds may go undeveloped. However, once development 
capital is sunk, the 87.6/12.4 split of operating costs results in   ﬁ  rst- best 
incentives for extraction.
Competition in the Libyan round was intense, with an average of seven 
bidders per block. The winning production shares ranged from 61.1 to 
89.2 percent with a mean of 80.5 percent. The Government Take (share of 
project proﬁ  ts) depends on the assumptions one makes on costs and reve-
nues. Johnston (2005) estimated the Government Take to range from 77.0 
to 97.7 percent with a mean of 89.9 percent, well above the 80 percent that 
is more typically captured for good prospects or the 77 percent realized in 
the U.S. auctions before 1990.
The 1996 Venezuela auction of 10 blocks had similar contract terms 
and also was highly successful. There   were, however, some important 
differences. The 10 blocks   were offered in sequence. Also, to maintain 
better development incentives, the production share bids   were capped at 
50 percent. First, the bidders bid production shares, and then in the event 
of a tie (e.g., two or more bid 50 percent) the bidders bid signature bo-
nuses to break the tie. This resulted in large signature bonuses for desir-
able blocks, shifting risk to the winning oil companies. However, the 
Venezuelan terms   were more favorable than the Libyan terms with re-
spect to cost recovery, so it is unclear which terms   were riskier. Indeed, 
the Government Take estimate of 92 percent remains a landmark ﬁ  gure 
(Johnston 2005).3
Both of these examples illustrate the success of   ﬁ  rst- price   sealed- bid  auc-
tions. In light of the revenue equivalence theorem, this is not surprising. All 
competitive auctions, regardless of design, should generate substantial gov-
ernment revenues for excellent prospects. However, these examples do not 
show that the chosen approach was best. Indeed, revenues would be even 
higher if a simultaneous ascending   auction   was used.RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH AUCTIONS  
IN OTHER INDUSTRIES
Over the last 10 years, there has been a great advance in the development 
of methods for auctioning many related items. Innovative auction designs 
have been proposed and applied to allocation problems in several indus-
tries. The auction of radio spectrum is one important example, but these 
methods have been adopted in several industries, such as energy and 
transportation.
SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTION
The simultaneous ascending auction is one of the most successful methods 
for auctioning many related items. It was ﬁ  rst introduced in U.S. spectrum 
auctions in July 1994, and later used in dozens of spectrum auctions world-
wide, resulting in revenues in excess of $200 billion (Cramton 2002).
The simultaneous ascending auction is a natural generalization of the 
En glish  auction when selling many items. The key features are that all the 
items are up for auction at the same time, each with a price associated 
with it, and the bidders can bid on any of the items. The bidding contin-
ues until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any of the items. Then the 
auction ends with each bidder winning the items on which it has the high 
bid, and paying its bid for any items won.
The reason for the success of this simple procedure is the excellent 
“price discovery” it affords.4 As the auction progresses bidders see the ten-
tative price information and condition subsequent bids on this new infor-
mation. Over the course of the auction, bidders are able to develop a sense 
of what the ﬁ  nal prices are likely to be, and can adjust their purchases in 
response to this price information. To the extent price information is suf-
ﬁ  ciently good and the bidders retain sufﬁ  cient ﬂ  exibility to shift toward 
their best package, the exposure problem is   mitigated—bidders are able to 
piece together a desirable package of items, despite the constraint of bid-
ding on individual items rather than packages. Moreover, the price infor-
mation helps the bidders focus their valuation efforts in the relevant range 
of the price space.
Auctions have become the preferred method of assigning spectrum and 
most have been simultaneous ascending auctions. (See Cramton 1997 and 
Milgrom 2004 for a history of the auctions.) There is now substantial evi-
dence that this auction design has been successful (Cramton 1997; McAfee 
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and McMillan 1996), with revenues often exceeding industry and govern-
ment estimates. The simultaneous ascending auction may be partially re-
sponsible for the large revenues. By revealing information in the auction 
pro  cess, bidder uncertainty is reduced, and the bidders safely can bid 
more aggressively. Also, revenues may increase to the extent the design en-
ables bidders to piece together more efﬁ  cient packages of items.
Despite the general success, the simultaneous ascending auctions have 
experienced a few problems from which one can draw important lessons 
(Cramton and Schwartz 2002). One basic problem is the simultaneous as-
cending auction’s vulnerability to   revenue-  reducing strategies in situations 
where competition is weak. Bidders have an incentive to try to work to-
gether to reduce their demands in order to keep prices low, and to use bid 
signaling strategies to coordinate on a split of the items.
A second problem in the early U.S. auctions arose from overly generous 
installment payment terms for small businesses. This led to speculative 
bidding. Winning prices   were well above subsequent market prices, and 
most ﬁ  rms defaulted on the installments and went into bankruptcy. The 
end result was that substantial portions of the mobile wireless capacity lay 
fallow for nearly 10 years. Some 3G auctions in Eu  rope (notably the U.K. 
and German auctions) also ended at prices well in excess of subsequent 
market prices. However, the Eu  ro  pe  an auctions did not allow installment 
payments, so the outcome was simply a wealth transfer from the share-
holders of the telecommunications companies to the taxpayers.
SIMULTANEOUS CLOCK AUCTION
A variation of the simultaneous ascending auction is the simultaneous 
clock auction. The critical difference is that bidders simply respond with 
quantities desired at prices speciﬁ  ed by the auctioneer. Clock auctions are 
especially effective in auctioning many divisible goods, like electricity, but 
the approach also works well for indivisible items like oil licenses. There is 
a price “clock” for each item indicating its tentative price. Bidders express 
the blocks desired at the current prices. For those blocks with excess de-
mand the price is raised and bidders again express their desired blocks at 
the new prices. This pro  cess continues until supply just equals demand. 
The tentative prices and assignments then become ﬁ  nal.
Clock auctions have been used with great success in many countries 
to auction electricity, gas, pollution allowances, and radio spectrum. Par-
ticipants value the simplicity and price discovery of the auction. Further, auction theory suggests that in a competitive setting, if bidding is contin-
uous, then the clock auction is efﬁ  cient with prices equal to the competitive 
equilibrium (Ausubel and Cramton 2004). This provides a strong rationale 
to adopt this auction format.
If bidding is not continuous (in the sense that there are discrete rounds) 
then issues of bid increments, ties, and rationing are important. But there 
is an easy solution to these problems in which bidders are allowed to ex-
press their demands for all points along the line segment between the start 
of round prices and the end of round prices. Allowing a rich expression of 
preferences within a round makes bid increments, ties, and rationing less 
important. Since preferences for intermediate prices can be expressed, the 
efﬁ  ciency loss associated with the discrete increment is less, so the auc-
tioneer can choose a larger bid increment, resulting in a faster and less 
costly auction pro  cess.
The problem of noncompetitive settings is more difﬁ  cult to handle, but 
there are some things that can be done. Although some auction settings ap-
proximate the ideal of perfect competition, most do not. In the U.S. oil auc-
tions, especially in recent years when more marginal tracts have been 
offered, it is common for tracts to receive one or zero bids. In such a setting, 
tacit collusion is a real concern with the dynamic auction. One solution is to 
limit the amount of information that the bidders receive after each round of 
the auction. In doing this, the auctioneer can enhance the desirable proper-
ties of price and assignment discovery, while limiting the scope for collusive 
bidding. In the clock auction, this is done by only reporting the total quan-
tity demanded for each block, rather than all the bids and bidder identities, 
as is commonly done in the simultaneous ascending auction.
DETAILS MATTER
Not all auctions are successful. The most common source of failure is a 
lack of participation. Sometimes this is because what is being sold has lit-
tle value. Other times the lack of competition is the result of a poor auc-
tion pro  cess, for example, the product is ill deﬁ  ned, the marketing is 
inadequate, or the po  liti  cal risks are too great. Recognition of the needs of 
the bidders is critical in getting participation. An important lesson is that 
careful planning and design are essential to maximizing results and that 
this can often be achieved through a prior pro  cess of consultation with 
prospective bidders. These efforts can translate into billions of dollars in 
higher revenues.
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A PRACTICAL PACKAGE AUCTION
We have seen that there are theoretical reasons to expect that some ver-
sion of a simultaneous ascending auction will make sense for auctioning 
oil rights; we have seen, further, that this type of auction design has 
been very successful in other industries. In this section, I describe a 
practical method for auctioning many related items. The version I 
 d e s c r i b e — t h e    c l o c k -  p r o x y auction (Ausubel et al.   2006)—also allows 
for package bids and so is especially appropriate to some oil and gas set-
tings. I then turn to discuss variations for situations where packaging is-
sues are less important. All methods are described with oil rights 
auctions in mind. The items sold are licenses to explore and develop 
speciﬁ  ed geographic blocks. The bidder expresses quantities of either 0 
(“No”) or 1 (“Yes”) for each block offered. The method combines two 
auction   formats—the clock auction and the proxy   auction—to produce 
a hybrid with the beneﬁ  ts of both.
The clock auction, as described earlier, is an iterative auction procedure 
in which the auctioneer announces prices, one for each of the items being 
sold. The bidders then indicate the licenses desired at the current prices. 
Prices for items with excess demand then increase, and the bidders again 
express quantities at the new prices. This pro  cess is repeated until there 
are no items with excess demand.
The ascending proxy auction is a par  tic  u  lar package bidding procedure 
with desirable properties (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). The bidders re-
port values to their respective proxy agents. The proxies are in fact algo-
rithms that receive information from the bidders just once and are then 
programmed to bid in the interests of the bidder. They iteratively submit 
package bids on behalf of the bidders, selecting the best proﬁ  t opportu-
nity for a bidder given the bidder’s inputted values. For example, if the 
proxy is told by a bidder that a block is worth $100M, the proxy will bid 
up to $100M in order to get the block but will never bid more than is 
needed to secure the block. The auctioneer then selects the provisionally 
winning bids that maximize revenues. This pro  cess continues until the 
proxy agents have no new bids to submit.
The   clock- proxy auction begins with a clock phase and ends with a ﬁ  -
nal proxy round. All bids are kept live throughout the auction. There are 
no bid withdrawals and the bids of a par  tic  u  lar bidder are mutually exclu-
sive. Finally, there is an activity rule throughout the clock phase and be-
tween the clock phase and the proxy round.CLOCK PHASE
The clock phase has several important beneﬁ  ts. First, it is simple for the 
bidders. At each round, the bidder simply expresses the set of licenses de-
sired at the current prices. Additive pricing means that it is trivial to eval-
uate the cost of any   package—it is just the sum of the prices for the 
selected licenses. Limiting the bidders’ information to a reporting of the 
excess demand for each item removes much strategizing. Complex bid 
signaling and collusive strategies are eliminated, as the bidders cannot 
see individual bids, but only aggregate information. Second, the clock 
phase produces highly useable price discovery, because of the item prices. 
With each bidding round, the bidders get a better understanding of the 
likely prices for relevant packages. This is essential information in guid-
ing the bidders’ decision making. Bidders are able to focus their valua-
tion efforts on the most relevant portion of the price space. As a result, 
the valuation efforts are more productive. Bidder participation costs fall 
and efﬁ  ciency improves.
The weakness of the clock auction is its use of additive pricing at the 
end of the auction. This means that, to the extent that there is market 
power, bidders will have an incentive to engage in demand reduction to 
favorably impact prices. This demand reduction implies that the auction 
outcome will not be fully efﬁ  cient (Ausubel and Cramton 2002). The 
proxy phase will however eliminate this inefﬁ  ciency.
There are several design choices that will improve the per  for  mance of 
the clock phase, when packaging issues are important. Good choices can 
avoid the exposure problem, improve price discovery, and handle discrete 
rounds.
Avoiding the exposure problem
To avoid the exposure problem, the clock phase can allow a bidder to drop 
a license so long as the price has increased on some license the bidder was 
demanding. This ﬂ  exibility is needed in the case of complements. The 
bidder may want to drop a license when the price of a complementary li-
cense increases. With this rule, the clock auction becomes a package auc-
tion. For each price vector, the bidder expresses the package of licenses 
desired without committing itself to demanding any smaller package. 
The disadvantage of this rule is that the clock phase may end with a sub-
stantial number of unsold licenses. However, this undersell will be re-
solved in the proxy phase.
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Improving price discovery
In auctions with more than a few items, the sheer number of packages 
that a bidder might buy makes it impossible for bidders to determine all 
their values in advance. Bidders adapt to this problem by focusing most of 
their attention on the packages that are likely to be valuable relative to 
their forecast prices. A common heuristic to forecast package prices is to 
estimate the prices of individual items and to sum these up over the ele-
ments in the package. Clock auctions with individual prices assist bidders 
in this price discovery pro cess.
Price discovery is undermined to the extent that bidders misrepresent 
their demands early in the auction. One possibility is that bidders will 
choose to underbid in the clock phase, hiding as a “snake in the grass” to 
conceal their true interests from their opponents. To limit this form of in-
sincere bidding, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
introduced the   Milgrom-  Wilson activity rule, and similar activity rules 
have since become standard in both clock auctions and simultaneous as-
cending auctions. In its most typical form, a bidder desiring large quanti-
ties at the end of the auction must bid for quantities at least as large early 
in the auction, when prices are lower.
The most common activity rule in clock auctions is monotonicity in 
quantity. As prices rise, quantities cannot increase. This means that bid-
ders must bid in a way that is consistent with a weakly downward sloping 
demand curve. This works well when auctioning a single product, but is 
overly restrictive when there are many different products. If the products 
are substitutes, it is natural for a bidder to want to shift quantity from one 
product to another as prices change, effectively arbitraging the price dif-
ferences between substitute products.
A weaker activity requirement is a monotonicity of a bidder’s aggregate 
quantity. This allows ﬂ  exibility in shifting among licenses. This is the ba-
sis for the FCC’s activity rule. A weakness of this rule is that it assumes 
that quantities are readily comparable. Oil licenses, however, are not com-
parable. For example, the area of the block is a poor mea  sure of quantity.
Ausubel et al. (2006) propose an alternative activity rule based on re-
vealed preference that does not require any aggregate quantity mea  sure. 
This rule is suitable for bonus bidding, but not for bidding on production 
shares. The rule is derived from standard consumer theory and works as 
follows. Consider any two times, denoted s and t (s < t). Let ps and pt be the price vectors at these times. Let xs and xt be the associated demands of 
some bidder at these two points in time, and assume that xs is different 
from xt. Finally, let v(x) be the bidder’s value of a given package x. Unfor-
tunately v(x) is not known; nonetheless, we can derive a very simple con-
dition on the relationship between the prices and the quantities if xs and 
xt reﬂ  ect the demands of a sincere bidder, even though v is not known. 
With a price vector ps and a vector of demands for blocks xs (xs is in this 
case a set of 0’s and 1’s), the amount that a buyer pays is given by ps · xs. 
Similarly the total cost of a vector xt at prices ps is given by ps · xt. Now, a 
sincere bidder prefers xs to xt when prices are ps and prefers xt to xs when 
prices are pt. This means that:
v(xs) − ps · xs ≥ v(xt) − ps · xt
and
v(xt) − pt · xt ≥ v(xs) − pt · xs.
Adding these two inequalities together yields the revealed preference ac-
tivity rule:
(pt − ps) · (xt − xs) ≤ 0.
This  in e qual ity  gives a condition on the prices and quantities that should 
hold for a sincere bidder without using any information about v. This con-
dition can be used as a rule in auction design: At every time t, the bidder’s 
demand xt must satisfy this condition for all times t > s. Straightforward 
  bidding—bidding on the most proﬁ  table package at every   instant—will 
always satisfy the condition.
Handling discrete rounds
As described in the preceding text, discrete bidding rounds are handled 
with   intra-  round bidding, enabling the bidder to express quantity reduc-
tions at any prices between the   start-  of-  round  price  and  the   end- of- round 
price. This allows the use of much larger bid increments without much loss 
in efﬁ  ciency. In this way, the auctioneer can better control the pace of the 
auction, which is important   here given the large uncertainty in block 
values.
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PROXY PHASE
Like the clock auction, the proxy auction is based on package bids. How-
ever, the incentives are quite different. The main difference is the absence of 
additive prices on individual items. Only packages are   priced—and the 
prices may be bidder speciﬁ  c. This weakens price discovery, but the proxy 
phase is not about price discovery. It is about providing the incentives for ef-
ﬁ  cient assignment. All the price discovery occurs in the clock phase. The 
second main difference is that the bidders do not bid directly in the proxy 
phase. Rather, they submit values to the proxy agents, who then bid on their 
behalf using a speciﬁ  c bidding rule. The proxy agents bid straightforwardly 
to maximize proﬁ  ts. The proxy phase is a last and ﬁ  nal opportunity to bid.
The proxy auction works as follows (see Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). 
Each bidder reports his values to a proxy agent for all packages that the 
bidder is interested in. Bud  get constraints can also be reported. The proxy 
agent then bids in an ascending package auction on behalf of the real bid-
der, iteratively submitting the allowable bid that, if accepted, would maxi-
mize the real bidder’s proﬁ  t (value minus price), based on the reported 
values. The auction in theory is conducted with inﬁ  nitesimally small bid 
increments. After each round, provisionally winning bids are determined 
that maximize seller revenue from compatible bids. All of a bidder’s bids 
are kept live throughout the auction and are treated as mutually exclusive. 
The auction ends after a round with no new bids. For more information 
on the practicalities of how to implement the proxy phase, see the descrip-
tion in Day and Raghavan (2004).
The advantage of this format is that it produces an outcome for which 
there is no other allocation that the seller and any collection of bidders all 
prefer (where “preference” is given in terms of the reported preferences of 
the bidders). In economic theory, we say that such an outcome is in the 
“core.” In principle there can be many outcomes in the core, but every 
outcome that is in the core has the property that the seller would not be 
able to ﬁ  nd an alternative group of buyers that would be willing, collec-
tively, to pay more for the goods on sale (see Ausubel and Milgrom 2002; 
Parkes and Ungar 2000). Hence under this method, the seller earns com-
petitive revenues. The fact that the outcome is in the core also implies 
that it is efﬁ  cient. In par  tic  u  lar this means that the proxy auction is not 
subject to the inefﬁ  ciency of demand reduction: no bidder can ever reduce 
the price it pays for the package it wins by withholding some of its losing 
bids for other packages.THE   CLOCK-  PROXY AUCTION
The   clock- proxy  auction is a recent innovation in auction design. Although 
it has been used successfully in a spectrum auction in a developing country 
(Trinidad and Tobago, June 2005), it has not yet been applied to oil rights 
auctions. The   clock-  proxy auction begins with a clock auction for price dis-
covery and concludes with the proxy auction to promote efﬁ  ciency.
The clock auction is conducted with the   revealed- preference  activity 
rule until there is no excess demand on any item. The   market-  clearing 
item prices determine the initial minimum bids for all packages for all 
bidders. Bidders then submit values to proxy agents, who bid to maximize 
proﬁ  ts, subject to a relaxed   revealed-  preference activity rule (see Ausubel 
[2006] for details). The relaxed   revealed-  preference activity rule operates 
also between the rounds and so bidders that failed to bid aggressively in 
the clock stage are constrained on how aggressively they can behave in the 
proxy stage. The bids from the clock phase are kept live as package bids in 
the proxy phase. All of a bidder’s bids, both clock and proxy, are treated as 
mutually exclusive. Thus, the auctioneer obtains the provisional winning 
bids after each round of the proxy phase by including all   bids—those 
submitted in the clock phase as well as those submitted in the proxy   phase—
in the winner determination problem and by selecting at most one provi-
sional winning bid from every bidder. As usual, the proxy phase ends after 
a round with no new bids.
WHY INCLUDE THE CLOCK PHASE?
The clock phase provides price discovery that bidders can use to guide 
their calculations in the complex package auction. At each round, bidders 
are faced with the simple and familiar problem of expressing demands at 
speciﬁ  ed prices. Moreover, because there is no exposure problem, bidders 
can bid for synergistic gains without fear. Prices then adjust in response to 
excess demand. As the bidding continues, bidders get a better under-
standing of what they may win and where their best opportunities lie.
The case for the clock phase relies on the idea that it is costly for bid-
ders to determine their preferences. The clock phase, by providing tenta-
tive price information, helps focus a bidder’s decision problem. Rather 
than consider all possibilities from the outset, the bidder can instead fo-
cus on cases that are important given the tentative price and assign-
ment information. Although the idea that bidders can make information 
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  pro  cessing decisions in auctions is valid even in auctions for a single good 
(Compte and Jehiel 2002), its importance is magniﬁ  ed when there are 
many goods for sale, because the bidder’s decision problem is then much 
more complicated. Rather than simply decide whether to buy at a given 
price, the bidder must decide which goods to buy and how many of each. 
The number of possibilities grows exponentially with the number of 
goods. Price discovery can play an extremely valuable role in guiding the 
bidder through the valuation pro  cess.
Price discovery in the clock phase makes bidding in the proxy phase 
vastly simpler. Without the clock phase, bidders would be forced either to 
determine values for all possible packages or to make uninformed guesses 
about which packages   were likely to be most attractive. My experience 
with dozens of bidders suggests that the second outcome is much more 
likely; determining the values of exponentially many packages becomes 
quickly impractical with even a modest number of items for sale. Using 
the clock phase to make informed guesses about prices, bidders can focus 
their decision making on the most relevant packages. The bidders see that 
they do not need to consider the vast majority of options, because the op-
tions are excluded by the prices established in the clock phase. The bid-
ders also get a sense of what packages are most promising, and how their 
demands ﬁ  t in the aggregate with those of the other bidders.
In competitive auctions where the items are substitutes and competi-
tion is strong, we can expect the clock phase to do most of the work in es-
tablishing prices and   assignments—the proxy phase would play a limited 
role. When competition is weak, demand reduction may lead the clock 
phase to end prematurely, but this problem is corrected at the proxy stage, 
which eliminates incentives for demand reduction. If the clock auction 
gives the bidders a good idea of likely package prices, then expressing a 
simple approximate valuation to the proxy is made easier.
WHY INCLUDE THE PROXY PHASE?
The main advantage of the proxy phase is that it pushes the outcome toward 
the core, that is, toward an efﬁ  cient allocation with competitive payoffs for 
the bidders and competitive revenues for the seller. In the proxy phase, there 
are no incentives for demand reduction. A large bidder can bid for large 
quantities without the fear that doing so will adversely impact the price the 
bidder pays. The proxy phase also mitigates collusion. Any collusive split of 
the items established in the clock phase can be undone in the proxy phase. done in the proxy phase. The relaxed activity rule means that the bidders 
can expand demands in the proxy phase. The allocation is still up for grabs 
in the proxy phase.
A natural concern with the proxy phase is that it may discourage bid-
ding in the clock phase. The activity rule that operates between the two 
phases is essential in mitigating this possibility. Bidders bid aggressively in 
the clock phase, knowing that a failure to do so will limit their options in 
the proxy phase.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
We brieﬂ y discuss three important implementation issues.
Confidentiality of values
One practical issue with the proxy phase is conﬁ  dentiality of values. Bid-
ders may be hesitant to bid true values in the proxy phase, fearing that the 
auctioneer would somehow manipulate the prices with a “seller shill”5 to 
push prices all the way to the bidders’ reported values. Steps need to be 
taken to assure that this cannot happen. A highly transparent auction pro-
cess helps to assure that the auction rules are followed. In fact, there is no 
reason that the auctioneer needs to be given access to the high values. 
Only the computer need know. Auction software can be tested and certi-
ﬁ  ed to be consistent with the auction rules. At the end of the auction, the 
auctioneer can report all the bids. The bidders can then conﬁ  rm that the 
outcome was consistent with the rules.
Price increments in the clock phase
 When auctioning many items, one must take care in deﬁ  ning the price 
adjustment pro  cess. This is especially true when some goods are comple-
ments. Intuitively, the clock phase performs best when each item clears at 
roughly the same time. Thus, the goal should be to come up with a price 
adjustment pro  cess that reﬂ  ects relative values as well as excess demand. 
Moreover, the price adjustment pro  cess effectively is resolving the “thresh-
old problem” by specifying who should contribute what as the clock ticks 
higher.6 To the extent that prices adjust with relative values, the resolution 
of the threshold problem will be more successful.
One simple approach is to build the relative value information into the 
initial starting prices. Then use a percentage increase rather than a ﬁ  xed 
increment increase, based on the extent of excess demand. For example, 
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the percentage increment could vary linearly with the excess demand, 
subject to a lower and upper limit. This will make it more likely that the 
demand for the different items clears at about the same time.
Expression of proxy values
Even with the beneﬁ  t of the price discovery in the clock phase, expressing 
a valuation function in the proxy phase may be difﬁ  cult  for bidders. 
When many items are being sold, the bidder will need a tool to facilitate 
translating preferences into proxy values. The best tool will depend on the 
circumstances. The seller can lower bidder participation costs by provid-
ing a useful tool to express valuations.
At a minimum, the tool will allow an additive valuation function. The 
bidder submits its maximum willingness to pay for each license. The value 
of a package is then found by adding up the values on each item in the 
package. This additive model ignores all value interdependencies across 
items; it assumes that the value for one item is in  de  pen  dent of what other 
items are won. Although globally (across a wide range of packages) this 
might be a bad assumption, locally (across a narrow range of packages) this 
might be a reasonable approximation, especially in the setting of oil rights. 
Hence, provided the clock phase has taken us close to the equilibrium, so 
the proxy phase is only doing some   ﬁ  ne-  tuning of the clock outcome, then 
such a simplistic tool may perform reasonably well. And of course it per-
forms very well when bidders actually have additive values.
The bidders’ business plans are a useful guide to determine how best to 
structure the valuation tool in a par  tic  u  lar setting. Business plans are an 
expression of value to investors. Although the details of the business plans 
are not available to the auctioneer, one can construct a useful valuation 
tool from understanding the basic structure of these business plans.
ALTERNATIVE AUCTION FORMATS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is not possible to specify one “best”   design—the best approach depends 
on the setting. The   clock- proxy auction as described above is an excellent 
choice in settings where packaging issues are important. In other settings, 
variations are worth considering. The variations depend on how four fea-
tures are handled (table 5.1).
The standard   clock-  proxy auction is deﬁ  ned by the ﬁ  rst option (a) for 
each issue in table 5.1: clock bidding for packages with the revealed prefer-ence activity rule, followed by a ﬁ  nal proxy round with package bids and 
  bidder-  optimal core pricing. This is a sensible choice when packaging is-
sues, value interdependencies and price discovery are important aspects of 
the setting. This approach is the most difﬁ  cult to implement, but accom-
modates the richest set of bidder valuations.
At the other extreme is the U.S. offshore approach, which is simultane-
ous   seal- bid for individual licenses with   pay-  as- bid  pricing (1c, 3b, 4b). 
This approach makes sense if there are no packaging issues (e.g., additive 
values), little value interdependencies, weak competition, and potentially 
large asymmetries among the bidders. Although this method is easy to 
implement, it is problematic for bidders unless values really are additive.
Another variation, close to the U.S. approach, has clock bidding on 
individual licenses, a   license-  by-  license activity rule, and no proxy bid-
ding (1b, 2b, 3c). This effectively is a simultaneous ascending auction 
version of the U.S. approach. This is sensible in settings where packag-
ing is of only minor importance (nearly additive values), but value inter-
dependencies make price discovery important. This approach also works 
best when competition is not too weak and bidder asymmetries are not 
too large.
A similar variation, close to the U.S. spectrum auctions, is clock bid-
ding on individual licenses, a revealed preference activity rule, and no 
proxy round (1b, 2a, 3c). This works well when there are moderate packag-
ing issues and value interdependencies. The approach has good price dis-
covery and does allow bidders to piece together desirable packages of 
licenses. The format improves on the U.S. spectrum auctions in two re-
spects. Tacit collusion is mitigated with the use of clocks and only report-
ing excess demand, rather than all bids. Efﬁ  cient packaging is facilitated 
with the revealed preference activity rule. This method is easy to imple-
ment and yet accommodates a richer set of valuations.
Table 5.1  Designing a   Clock-  Proxy Auction
Feature: 1. Clock 
bidding
2. Activity rule 3. Proxy 
bidding
















b.  Pay- as- bid
c. None c. None
Note: This table lists the main options available to auction designers for four key components of the 
  clock- proxy  auction.
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A ﬁ  nal variation, related to the   Anglo-  Dutch format7  (Klemperer 
2002), has clock bidding on individual licenses, a revealed preference ac-
tivity rule, and a proxy round with individual license bids and   pay- as- bid 
pricing (1b, 2a, 3b, 4b). However, in this variation, the price clock stops 
when demand falls to two on the license, so there is still excess demand. 
The excess demand is then resolved in the simultaneous   pay-  as- bid  proxy 
round. This approach is well suited to situations where packaging is of 
minor importance (nearly additive values), but value interdependencies 
make price discovery valuable, and competition is weak with potentially 
large bidder asymmetries. The approach enjoys some of the price discov-
ery beneﬁ  ts of the dynamic methods, but   handles weak competition and 
bidder asymmetries better than the approach without a   last-  and- ﬁ  nal 
round. The approaches are summarized in table 5.2.
For settings in which there are sets of licenses with substantially dif-
ferent value structures, it makes sense to use different formats with dif-
ferent sets of licenses. For example, a country may have 12  wildcat 
blocks that are excellent prospects, 36 drainage blocks that are good to 
excellent prospects, and 200 blocks that are marginal prospects. The ex-
cellent prospects could be done as a standard   clock-  proxy, the drainage 
blocks as an   Anglo- Dutch,  and the marginal prospects as a   ﬁ r s t -   p r i c e  
  sealed- bid.  With  this approach the   clock-  proxy auction is not compli-
cated by the great number of drainage and marginal blocks. Moreover, 
the drainage blocks may have large asymmetries among the bidders as a 
result of private drilling information from neighboring blocks. The 
  Anglo- Dutch  design handles these asymmetries well. Finally, additive 
values are probably a good assumption on marginal prospects and in 
any event, the economic loss from the less efﬁ   cient   ﬁ   rst- price   sealed- bid 
approach is not great when auctioning marginal licenses. Alternatively, 
since implementing three different formats is probably too much, the 
country could split the blocks into two sets: those with high prospects 
and those with low prospects. The   ﬁ  rst-  price   sealed-  bid format could be 
used for the   low-  prospect blocks and one of the dynamic formats could 
be used for the   high-  prospect blocks.
LIBYA AND VENEZUELA RECONSIDERED
Although the 2005 Libya auction and 1996 Venezuela auction   were suc-
cessful, they could probably be improved. The Libya auction, using si-
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packaging. The Venezuela auction, using sequential   sealed-  bids, allowed 
only minimal price discovery and packaging. In both auctions, competi-
tion was anticipated to be strong. Values included both private and com-
mon elements, although the common elements   were more important. 
Values probably   were nearly additive, although bidders likely faced bud  get 
and risk constraints given the size of the commitment.
In such a setting, a simultaneous clock auction is desirable, and espe-
cially simple given the small number of blocks. Bids would be over the 
production share. In the case of Venezuela, the 50 percent cap on pro-
duction share could be dropped and the terms could be adjusted so that 
the government has a share in the development capital expense, thereby 
improving the development incentives without limiting the production 
share. A   license-  by-  license activity rule (no switching) is desirable given 
the bidding is on production shares. Under this rule, once a bidder stops 
bidding on a block, the bidder cannot return to the block at higher pro-
duction shares. This simple rule allows price discovery and some degree 
of packaging.
CONCLUSION
Auctions are a desirable method of assigning and pricing scarce oil rights. 
A   well-  designed auction encourages participation through a transparent 
competitive pro  cess. The design promotes both an efﬁ  cient assignment of 
the rights and competitive revenues for the seller.
I ﬁ  nd that a variety of auction formats are suitable for auctioning oil 
rights. The best auction format depends on the par  tic  u  lar setting, espe-
cially the structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition. 
When bidders have additive values and competition is weak, a simultane-
ous   ﬁ  rst- price   sealed- bid  auction may be best, especially if the blocks are 
marginal prospects (relatively low value). When bidders have nearly addi-
tive values and competition is stronger, then one of the clock auctions 
should be considered. This approach will improve price discovery and re-
duce bidder uncertainty, improving efﬁ  ciency and revenues. Finally, for 
  high-  value blocks in which packaging issues are important (bidders care 
about the par  tic  u  lar package of blocks won), a   clock-  proxy auction is ap-
propriate. The   clock-  proxy auction has excellent price discovery and 
handles complex bidder preferences involving substitutes and comple-
ments. The   clock-  proxy auction does well on both efﬁ  ciency and revenue 
grounds.In closing, I emphasize a theme raised elsewhere in this volume (see es-
pecially chapters 2 and 3): Regardless of the auction format, a critical ele-
ment of the design is deﬁ  ning what is being bid. The what element is just 
as important as the how element. Possibilities include bonus bids, royalty 
rates, or production shares. Bidding on production shares, rather than bo-
nuses, for example, typically increases Government Take by reducing oil 
company risk and fears of expropriation. More generally, these contract 
terms determine key features such as the allocation of risk between coun-
try and oil company, the cash ﬂ  ows over time, and the incentives for ex-
ploration and development.
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NOTES
1.   Sealed-  bid auctions are static auctions in which the bidders simultaneously sub-
mit bids in sealed envelopes to the auctioneer. The auctioneer then orders the bids 
from highest to lowest. The highest bidder wins the item. In a   ﬁ  rst-  price auction, the 
highest bidder pays its bid. In a   second-  price auction, the highest bidder pays the 
  second-  highest bid for the item. The En  glish ascending and Dutch descending are 
dynamic auctions that occur in a series of rounds or with a continuous price “clock.” 
In the En  glish auction, the bidders have the opportunity to improve their bids until 
no bidder is willing to bid any higher; the high bidder then pays its bid. In the Dutch 
auction, the auctioneer begins with a high price that no bidder is willing to accept; the 
auctioneer then reduces the price until a bidder indicates ac  cep  tance; this bidder wins 
the item and pays the last price called out by the auctioneer.
2. However, a likely exception to this recommendation is for drainage blocks in 
which one bidder has much better information about value.
3. Government Take is a calculated estimate of the government’s share in the 
project proﬁ  ts, given all the contract terms. Production share is simply the split of 
the oil revenue between government and the oil company. Thus, it is perfectly rea-
sonable for Government Take to be 92 percent even though the production share is 
50 percent.
4. Price discovery is a feature of dynamic auctions in which tentative price infor-
mation is reported to bidders, giving bidders the opportunity to adjust subsequent 
bids based on the price information.
5. A seller shill is a fake bidder created by the seller. The shill bids in a way to in-
crease auction revenues. Shills are especially a problem in ascending auctions and 
  second- price auctions.
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6. The threshold problem is the problem that allowing package bids may favor 
bidders seeking larger packages, because small bidders do not have the incentive or 
capability to unilaterally top the tentative winning bids of a large bidder.
7. The   Anglo-  Dutch format is an ascending clock auction that stops while there 
is still excess demand, at which point a ﬁ  nal   ﬁ  rst- price   sealed- bid round is conducted 
among those bidders that are still active at the end of the clock phase.
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